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The advent of sponsored search advertising raises many interesting questions regarding 
consumer's behavior, seller's advertising strategy, and the ensuing market dynamics.   Online 
markets are characterized by significant information asymmetries and consumers rely on a number 
of informational cues or signals to infer the seller's quality. Of the various quality signals, 
advertising and price have been identified as being the two most important cues used by 
consumers in traditional markets. However, online sponsored search markets have a number of 
unique characteristics which may affect consumer search and purchase behavior.  This study 
employs theories from IS, marketing, and economics to understand the impact of sponsored search 
advertising on consumer behavior in a market that exhibits information asymmetry.  We conduct a 
lab experiment and find that the availability of relative advertising expenditure -- observed by the 
position of the sellers on the sponsored search listings has a significant impact on consumer 
purchase behavior. 
 
Keywords:  Sponsored Search Advertising, price, quality, signal, quality uncertainty, experiment, 
consumer behavior.   
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Introduction  
Recent reports suggest that Internet advertising, especially in the sponsored search format, is growing at 
unprecedented rates and is expected to become a dominant form of customer acquisition for traditional firms.  
Indeed, sponsored search advertising has very rapidly become an important and significant forum for advertisers, 
accounting for 40% of all advertising spending online (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005).  Sponsored search (also 
known as “paid search” or “pay-for-placement” or “keyword”) advertisements are text-based advertisements that are 
displayed alongside “organic” (algorithm-based) search results, in response to a user’s search query. The sponsored 
search model employs an auction mechanism for pricing the placement/position of an advertisement in the 
sponsored search listing for each keyword.  Advertisers bid on keywords relevant to their product or service, for 
enhanced placement (i.e., higher rank) of their advertisements in sponsored search results.  The higher the bid, the 
higher the advertiser’s message appears in the sponsored search list, which should typically lead to more sales-leads 
(click-throughs), and consequently greater sales.   
Given the various advantages of sponsored search advertising over traditional approaches, including the ability to 
precisely target messages to potential consumers who are actively searching for sellers, and enabling sellers to more 
directly relate advertising expenditures to outcomes, the rapid growth of sponsored search is not surprising.  Despite 
the phenomenal growth and increase in overall spending, however, research on the implications of this new form of 
advertising is scarce.  Specifically, consumer behavior in the context of online sponsored search advertising is 
surprisingly unexplored, with few notable exceptions (Hoque and Lohse, 1999; Jansen and Resnick, 2006).   
It is well known that search engine results have a significant influence on consumer’s purchase decisions.  Recent 
studies show that consumers tend to focus on the top results in these search listings and are more likely to select a 
seller listed higher (DoubleClick, 2006).  Yet, more than 62% of consumers are not knowledgeable about why a 
seller is listed higher, i.e., the allocation mechanism (Fallows, 2005).  Unaware that sellers pay to appear on higher 
positions, a large proportion of consumers (36%) believe that that a seller appearing higher in search results is more 
prominent than those appearing at lower ranks (iProspect, 2006).  How would consumer behavior change if 
consumers knew about the underlying auction driving sellers’ positions in the listing?  This question becomes 
especially important in the markets where consumers cannot easily distinguish the quality of the sellers prior to 
purchase.  Extant research suggests that consumers may rely on indirect cues or signals to infer the quality of sellers 
in such markets that exhibit quality uncertainty (Kirmani and Wright, 1989).  While the importance of advertising 
and price as signals of quality have been well established in traditional markets (Gerstner, 1985; Kirmani and 
Wright, 1989; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Peterson, 1970), the unique informational environment created by 
sponsored search advertising calls for an investigation of the impact of these signals on consumer behavior in the 
context of sponsored search markets.   
An examination of the quality signaling role of sponsored search advertising becomes especially important due to 
the prevalence of large quality variations among sellers selling seemingly homogenous products on the Internet 
(Baylis and Perloff, 2002).  In particular the nascence of online sponsored search markets and the lack of 
geographical limitations exposes consumers to new firms and less known sellers.  The pay for performance and self-
service nature of sponsored advertising further aggravates this problem by dramatically lowering the barriers to 
entry for smaller firms to advertise nationally.  This further diminishes the role of brand name in consumer decision 
making, and increases the reliance on other indirect information cues such as advertising and price charged by the 
sellers.  Given the extent of information asymmetry in online markets, consumers using these markets may rely on a 
number of informational cues or signals to infer the quality of the sellers in these markets – advertising and price 
being the two most important among them.  As a result of the underlying rank allocation mechanism based on 
auctions for specific keywords that ensure a higher placement for sellers, sponsored search markets provide indirect 
information about seller’s advertising intensity to the consumers.  Therefore, they have the potential to influence 
consumer’s search and purchase behavior, especially in a market with information asymmetry (i.e., quality 
uncertainty).  In this study we examine the extent to which sponsored search markets provide indirect quality cues to 
consumers and the resulting impact on consumer behavior.  Specifically, we examine the impact of informational 
cues (about the relative advertising expenditure of the firms) on consumers’ search behavior as well as purchase 
decisions in online sponsored search setting.  The research questions addressed in this paper are: 1) Can sponsored 
search advertising serve as a signal of quality and if so, under what circumstances?, 2) How do perceptions about the 
correlation between a seller’s advertising expenditure and quality affect consumers’ search and purchase behavior?, 
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and 3) How do price signals influence consumers’ reliance on advertising quality signals in their purchase 
decisions? 
 
Figure 1.  Research Model 
The research model is presented in Figure 1.  The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  We present a brief 
review of the sponsored search literature and other relevant literature from information systems, marketing, and 
economics that has studied consumer search and purchase behavior under quality certainty.  Next we present 
research hypotheses, research methodology, and results.  Finally, we provide a discussion of the findings and their 
implications.    
Related Research 
Given the growth in the sponsored search industry, it is not surprising that researchers and practitioners have 
focused their attention on understanding this online advertising phenomenon.  Much of this research approaches the 
phenomenon from an auctions lens, such as the design of more optimal better rank allocation mechanisms from the 
perspective of the search intermediary (Aggarwal, et al., 2006; Asdemir, 2006; Edelman, et al., forthcoming; Feng, 
et al., forthcoming; Lahaie, 2006; Varian, forthcoming), optimal bidding strategies for advertisers (Borgs, et al., 
2006; Kitts and Leblanc, 2004; Rusmevichientong and Williamson, 2006) and the underlying market dynamics in 
sponsored search auctions (Animesh, et al., 2006; Edelman and Ostrovsky, forthcoming).  Surprisingly, there is 
limited research examining consumer search behavior in this context. Jansen and Resnick (2005), in one of the few 
scholarly studies on consumer behavior in the sponsored search context, examine the perception of searchers 
towards sponsored search listings and find that consumers are skeptical of sponsored search results and trust them 
less as compared to organic search listings.  Our study adds to this stream of research by highlighting the importance 
of understanding consumer search behavior in these markets and its implications for the effectiveness of various 
sponsored search advertising strategies. 
Information Systems researchers have extensively examined the impact of online markets on the availability of price 
and quality information and how online provision of such information affects consumer welfare (Bakos, 1997; 
Bakos, et al., 2005; Baye and Morgan, 2002; Baylis and Perloff, 2002; Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000; Smith, 2001; 
Smith and Brynjolfsson, 2001).  As compared with a robust body of research on consumer behavior in online 
settings (e.g., Gefen, et al., 2003; Jarvenpaa, et al., 2000; Koufaris, 2002; Pavlou, 2003), work examining the 
influence of online advertising on consumer behavior is considerably more limited (for exceptions see Gao, et al., 
2004; Hong, et al., 2004; Wu, et al., 2005).  As a consequence of recent growth in online advertising, information 
system researchers have also started to study the impact of the informational environment created by online 
advertising medium on firms’ strategies as well as consumers’ behavior.  In one of the few IS studies on online 
advertising, Gao et al. (2004) examine the impact of animated versus pop-up advertisements on consumers’ 
perceptions and find that the online format and presentation of information significantly affects consumers’ 
perceptions and attitudes.  We extend this stream of research by examining the impact of sponsored search 
advertising on consumer’s perceptions and shopping behavior.   
Our specific focus is on the consumers’ perceptions of the quality of firms appearing within a sponsored search 
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research suggests that subtle changes in information presentation formats can influence consumer choice behavior 
(Payne, et al., 1993).  In an online setting, Mandel and Johnson (2002) found that even simple website design factors 
such as background pictures and colors can significantly influence the external search effort and consumer choice.  
Likewise, Lynch and Ariely (2000) show that website design of online stores can be used to influence the search 
cost of gathering price versus quality information.  This differential search cost in turn influences the price 
sensitivity of the consumers.  Mazursky and Vinitzky (2005) compared consumer search behavior in 2-dimensional 
versus 3-dimensional online shopping interfaces and found that the type of interface affects the consumer search 
intensity and sequence of search.  Hoque and Lohse (1999) also show that subtle changes in the user interface design 
can influence the information search costs and subsequent choice behavior.  Based on the findings, they suggest that 
unlike traditional yellow pages, online yellow pages should charge advertisers based on their rank in the advertising 
list.  They recommend that since online media exhibits different relationships than print media for some variables, 
researchers should strive to understand the consumer information processing and decision making processes.  Our 
study on sponsored search advertising is similar in spirit, but focuses on the quality signaling aspect of the ranking 
in the sponsored search listings, and more specifically, its impact on consumer behavior.   
In addition to the above mentioned research, two other streams of literature that are relevant to understanding 
consumer behavior in the sponsored search context are those related to consumer search, and quality signaling in 
markets with asymmetric information.  Researchers have examined consumer search behavior in markets that 
exhibit price dispersion.  A broad conclusion that emerges from the analytical as (Bakos, 1997; Stigler, 1961) as 
well as empirical work (Ratchford and Srinivasan, 1993; Schotter and Braunstein, 1981; Zhang, et al., 2006) is the 
salience of the reservation price in consumer purchase behavior.  Consumers use the existing price dispersion in the 
market and their unit search cost to compute a reservation price and choose the first seller who meets this reservation 
price.  Assumptions implicit in this work is that either quality is not important, or that quality can be ascertained by 
the consumer prior to a purchase decision.  In markets where quality is not easily identifiable, it is not immediately 
clear how consumer price search behavior would change.   
Quality signaling research on the other hand deals with markets that exhibit quality uncertainty but ignores 
consumer search for price or other information. This stream of research suggests that effective quality-signaling 
mechanisms are required for the functioning of markets with information asymmetries.  A signaling mechanism 
refers to indirect cues provided by a seller that reveal her true quality.  Various external cues (i.e., cues not directly 
related to product performance) – such as advertising, warranty, brand name and product price – have been 
identified as the signals of quality (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).  In the context of sponsored 
search, the role of advertising expenditure in providing quality cues becomes especially relevant.  In traditional 
settings, researchers have found that consumers associate higher advertising expenditure with higher quality 
(Kirmani and Wright, 1989).  However, unlike traditional media, a consumer can relatively easily get more accurate 
information about the relative advertising expenditure of all the sellers in the consideration set whereas the 
consumer has to incur search effort to obtain price information. Therefore, it becomes important to understand how 
consumer’s price search behavior may be affected by the presence of the advertising signal.  This study is among the 
first to examine these issues in the online sponsored search context.   
Hypothesis Development 
Sponsored-Search Advertising Mechanism: Advertising as a Signal of Quality 
Consumers may use sellers’ advertising expenditures as signal quality when they cannot infer the sellers’ 
service/product quality prior to purchase.  Results from experiments show a positive association between advertising 
expenditure and quality in the consumer’s mind (Kirmani and Wright, 1989).  Sponsored search listings provide a 
ranked list of sellers, sorted on the basis of their advertising intensity.  Thus, lacking adequate signals of quality, the 
relative advertising information contained in the advertisement allocation mechanism can be used as a signal of 
quality in sponsored search markets.  In particular, consumer’s awareness of the advertisement allocation 
mechanism provides enough information to consumers to infer relative quality of the sellers on the list.  Based on 
the insights from research in traditional media, we posit that: 
H1: Consumers who are aware of the ranking mechanism will perceive a positive rank-quality correlation (i.e.  
perception that sellers ranked higher on the list are higher quality sellers). 
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Impact of Price Information on the Effect of Advertising as a Signal of Quality 
In additional to signals like advertising expenditure, consumers may rely on price as a quality signal (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1986).  Results from empirical studies point to a robust (although moderate) price-quality relationship 
(Rao, 2005).  Further, we argue that availability of additional information, direct or indirect, would reduce 
consumers’ reliance on price as the signal of quality as consumers will also use other pieces of information to infer 
quality.  Specifically, presence of advertising expenditure information, in addition to pricing information, will lower 
the weight attached to price information in inferring quality (Broniarczyk and Alba, 1994)1. Thus we posit that: 
H2a: Consumers will perceive a positive price-quality correlation (i.e., sellers charging a higher price are of higher 
quality).   
H2b: Consumers who are aware of the ranking mechanism will have weaker belief in positive price-quality 
correlation as compared to the consumers who are unaware of the ranking mechanism. 
Advertising as a Signal of Quality 
While the above mentioned hypotheses relate advertising intensity (inferred from the advertiser’s rank in the search 
listings) to consumers’ perceptions of advertiser’s quality, these beliefs are likely to influence consumers search 
behavior, as well as their purchase decisions.  For instance, earlier studies (Roedder, et al., 1986) find that 
consumer’s prior beliefs about the price-quality correlation affect their search patterns.  In such a scenario, provided 
that the quality dispersion is sufficiently high compared to price dispersion2, the consumer would prefer to buy from 
the topmost sellers on the list, thus leading to high rank premium enjoyed by the sellers.   
Due to consumer’s strong preference to buy from one of the topmost sellers on the sponsored list, she would face a 
constrained set of alternatives to chose from.  Consequently, the search intensity to find the highest price offer will 
decrease and overall search effort will be lower as compared to the situation where consumer is unaware of firms’ 
relative advertising expenditures.  Finally, consumers who have strong belief in price as a signal of quality would 
search for the highest price (in the expectation of getting the best quality) and pay a high price premium. However, a 
consumer who has a strong belief in advertising as a signal of quality will only focus its price search among the top 
few sellers (i.e., constrained search) and thus will not be able to find or buy from sellers who are selling at higher 
prices (who might appear at lower ranks given that there is not correlation between price and advertising intensity). 
As a result the price premium paid by subjects with stronger advertising belief will be lower. 
Based on these arguments, we posit that:   
H3a: The stronger the consumer’s belief in advertising signal (i.e., positive rank-quality belief), the lower will be 
the price premium paid by the consumer. 
H3b: The stronger the consumer’s belief in advertising signal (i.e., positive rank-quality belief), the lower will be 
the consumer’s search intensity (i.e., number of alternative sellers visited). 
H3c: The stronger the consumer’s belief in advertising signal (i.e., positive rank-quality belief), the larger will be 
the rank premium enjoyed by the seller (i.e., a consumer’s propensity to buy from sellers appearing higher on the 
list).   
 
1 In order to isolate the relative weight attached by the consumers to price versus advertising signal, we focus on a 
market environment where price and advertising are not correlated.  Given such market environment (i.e., market 
where prices charged by sellers do not systematically decrease/increase as we go down the rank in the listing), 
consumers who believe in both price and quality signal can either act on the price as signal belief or advertising as 
signal belief. The tradeoff between price and advertising belief will be determined by the relative strength of the 
signaling beliefs. 
2 It is important to note here that quality signaling would exist only when there is quality dispersion in the market. 
The experimental design ensures that quality dispersion is greater than price dispersion in a market.  
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Price as a Signal of Quality 
Given a consumer’s belief that higher price signals higher quality, she will attempt to search for the higher price as 
long as the benefits from higher quality are greater that the benefits from lower price (i.e., price dispersion is smaller 
than quality dispersion).  However, to find the price charged by a seller, a consumer has to incur a search cost in 
visiting that seller’s website.  Given there is sufficiently high quality dispersion vis-à-vis price dispersion, stronger a 
consumer’s perception about positive price-quality correlation, higher will be the marginal benefit for an additional 
price search.  Consequently, the search intensity to find the highest price offer will increase and overall search effort 
will be higher as a function of the consumer’s belief in positive price-quality correlation3. Finally, consumers 
relying on price as a quality signal will be less sensitive to the rank of the sellers on the sponsored list.  As a result, 
unlike consumers who rely on adverting as a signal of quality, consumers relying on price signal will not 
systematically purchase from the seller’s appearing higher on the sponsored list.  Based on these arguments, we 
posit that: 
H4a: The stronger the consumer’s belief in the price signal (i.e., positive price-quality belief), the higher will be the 
price premium paid by the consumer. 
H4b: The stronger the consumer’s belief in the price signal (i.e., positive price-quality belief), the higher will be the 
consumer’s search intensity (i.e. number of alternative sellers visited). 
H4c: The stronger the consumer’s belief in the price signal (i.e., positive price-quality belief), the smaller will be the 
rank premium enjoyed by the seller (i.e.  a consumer’s propensity to buy from sellers appearing higher on the list).   
Interaction between Price and Advertising Signals 
Researchers have called for the need of studying the interactions among various signals of quality (Kirmani and 
Rao, 2000; Purohit and Srivastava, 2001).  This takes on added significance in the context of sponsored search as a 
consumer has access to not only relative advertising expenditures but also relative pricing information of competing 
firms.  However, the tradeoff between these different signals of quality has not been studied in the context of online 
shopping and purchase.  In prediction tasks, it has been found that consumer’s reliance on price signal is much 
stronger than her reliance on advertising signal (Broniarczyk and Alba, 1994).  We argue that the effect of a signal 
on the associated action taken by consumers will weaken in the presence of additional quality signals.  In our 
context, a consumer acting on both price and advertising signal beliefs would prefer to buy the highest priced 
product from the top seller.  However, since these signals are not correlated in our experimental setup, a consumer 
would have to compromise on one of the decision attributes (i.e., price signal or advertising/rank signal).  Thus, we 
hypothesize that:  
H5: The stronger the consumer’s belief in advertising signal (i.e., positive rank-quality belief), the weaker will be 
the impact of price signal (price-quality belief) on price premium.  
H6: The stronger the consumer’s belief in price signal (i.e., positive price-quality belief), the weaker will be the 
impact of advertising signal (rank-quality belief) on rank premium. 
Methodology 
Extant research on advertising signals and consumer search behavior has primarily used an experimental approach 
as it is the most appropriate method for achieving a clean test of theory (Lynch and Ariely, 2000; Schotter and 
Braunstein, 1981; Srivastava and Lurie, 2001; Zwick, et al., 2003).  Therefore, we employ an experimental 
methodology to test the above hypotheses.   
 
3 Even if the consumers believe that high price denotes high quality, still they have to incur search effort and search 
the listing to find the seller with the highest price.  
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Experiment Design 
The experiment employs a one factor (knowledge of sponsored search mechanism) between-subjects factorial design 
where one group of subjects is informed that sellers are ranked in descending order on the sponsored search listing 
according to how much they pay-per-click (treatment group), and the other group of subjects is informed that all 
sellers in the market are randomly assigned a rank on the directory listing (control group).  The subjects are 
presented one set of general instructions and a set of specific instructions for their assigned experimental condition 
(See Appendix B1 for details4).  The control group has 38 subjects, each of whom is informed that sellers are 
ordered randomly on the listing, while the treatment group consists of 42 subjects, each of whom is informed that 
sellers are ordered in the listing based on their relative advertising expenditures.  As is common in such 
experimental settings, undergraduate students in a large northeastern business school were recruited for this 
experiment.  The subjects participate for course credits.  In addition they are provided performance-based monetary 
incentives. 
Experiment Overview 
The experiment consists of 3 parts: (1) A Shopping Task in which subjects make search and purchase decisions (See 
Appendix B2), and (2) A Follow-Up Survey (See Appendix B3) in which subjects are asked questions about their 
beliefs about the price and advertising as signals of quality.   
Shopping Task: The shopping task requires subjects to conduct 10 shopping trips using a simulated online yellow 
pages directory.  In each shopping trip, subjects query the directory for a particular product.  The online directory 
presents a list of 10 sellers (identified by fictitious names) along with a link to visit their websites, in a rank-ordered 
listing.  The information provided to consumers about the ordering of the sellers in the directory listing differs across 
different experimental treatments.  The subjects are also informed about the price dispersion and the quality 
dispersion among the sellers in each market.  The quality dispersion (i.e., range of seller quality in a market) is 4 
times the price dispersion (i.e., range of prices in a market)5. Subjects can observe the price being charged by a 
seller but they have to incur a specified search cost to visit a seller’s website and obtain the price being charged by 
that seller.  The search cost at any point in time in a shopping trip is displayed on the top panel of the computer 
screen.  Information about seller quality is not revealed to the subjects in any treatment at any time during the 
experiment.  Subjects, however, can use advertising and/or pricing information to infer a seller’s quality.  We do not 
provide feedback about the quality of the sellers after each shopping round as the rationale behind using multiple 
shopping rounds was to compute aggregated measures to get a dependable/consistent measure of subject’s behavior 
in the given shopping environment rather than testing the learning behavior.  Another important point to note is that 
the price charged by the sellers and the rank at which they appeared on the listing were un-correlated to isolate the 
relative weight attached by the consumers to price versus advertising signal.. 
Subjects are asked to maximize their payoffs by buying from the highest quality seller at the lowest price while 
minimizing the total search cost.  The payoff function given to subjects is to maximize: U= Q – P – n*c  (where “Q” 
is the quality of the product purchased, “P” is the price paid for the purchased product, “c” is the cost to discover a 
seller’s price and “n” is the total number of sellers searched).  This utility function is similar to Diehl, Kornish et al.  
(2003), except that it explicitly includes search cost in the utility function.  Price, seller quality, and search cost are 
all expressed in experimental dollars.  The subjects are provided monetary incentives based on their performance in 
maximizing their payoff function (i.e., utility derived from the purchase). 
Measurement and Data 
Knowledge of the sponsored search advertising mechanism is included as a dummy variable that is used to identify 
those subjects who have different sets of information.  This variable is manipulated by providing information about 
the existence of sponsored search advertising mechanism to the subjects in the treatment groups before they make 
search and purchase decisions.  Subjects in the control group, on the other hand, are informed that the ordering of 
 
4 Appendices are available online at http://www.box.net/shared/h8id9lcrdj 
5 The rationale for having higher quality dispersion is to make the quality attribute - the key outcome of interest - 
more salient in the decision making process.  
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sellers in the listing is random.  This categorical variable is then, used to examine whether sponsored search 
advertising mechanism can act as a signaling mechanism.   
After completing the shopping task, the subjects state their beliefs about the correlation between seller’s price and 
seller’s quality as well as seller’s rank on the listing and seller’s quality.  Since the relative advertising expenditures 
of sellers are determined by their rank in the sponsored search listing (in the treatment sample), we use the term 
rank-quality as being synonymous with advertising-quality.  Perceived advertising-quality (HRHQ) and price-
quality (HPHQ) correlation is measured using a self reported measure, the items for which are adapted from existing 
literature (Kirmani, 1997; Kirmani and Wright, 1989).  We used a 7-point Likert scale for assessing the strength of 
advertising-quality and price-quality beliefs where 7 represents “strongly agree that there is a positive correlation” 
and 1 represent “strongly disagree that there is a positive correlation”.  A composite of 3 items was used to create 
advertisement-quality belief scale – HRHQ (cronbach’s alpha=0.86) and a composite of 2 items was used to create 
price-quality belief scale – HPHQ (cronbach’s alpha=0.86).  The items are presented in the Appendix B3.    
The dependent variables -- search intensity, price premium, and rank premium – are calculated based on observed 
behavior, and are recorded using click-stream data.  Search intensity (SearchIntensity) is measured as the total 
number of sellers visited by a subject in a given shopping trip.  Price premium (PricePremium) is the difference 
between the price at which the subject purchased the product during a shopping trip and the lowest price in that 
market.  The rank premium (RankPremium) is the rank of the seller from whom the subject made the purchase.  It is 
reverse coded variable where 1 represents highest rank (i.e.  top rank on the list), and 10 represents lowest rank (i.e.  
the bottom rank on the list).  Thus, a lower value of RankPremium represents a higher rank premium (i.e., indicating 
a bias towards selecting a seller from the top of the listing).  We create aggregated measure of rank premium, search, 
price premium and search intensity by taking the average over the 10 shopping rounds.  The descriptive statistics 
and correlations are presented in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.   
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Control Group Treatment Group 
N Mean 
Std.  
Dev. Min Max N Mean 
Std.  
Dev. Min Max 
SearchIntensity 38 2.87 1.38 1.00 9.20 42 3.05 1.68 1.30 10 
PricePremium 38 32.69 20.62 2.40 78.70 42 22.67 16.58 1.70 53.8 
RankPremium 38 4.60 1.14 2.40 6.90 42 4.20 1.45 1.80 7.5 
HPHQ 38 4.97 1.43 1.00 7.00 42 4.90 1.27 1.00 7 
HRHQ 38 2.44 1.09 1.00 4.33 42 4.60 1.36 2.00 7 
Table 2: Correlation Coefficients 
SearchIntensity PricePremium RankPremium HPHQ HRHQ 
SearchIntensity 1.00     
PricePremium -0.02 1.00    
(0.87)     
RankPremium -0.03 0.56 1.00   
(0.80) (0.00)    
HPHQ -0.07 0.44 0.19 1.00  
(0.55) (0.00) (0.09)   
HRHQ -0.01 -0.33 -0.29 -0.06 1.00 
(0.95) (0.00) (0.01) (0.57)  
p values are reported below the correlation coefficients 
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Results 
Manipulation Check 
Our manipulation was to provide relative advertising expenditure information to the treatment group but not to the 
control group.  To achieve this objective, subjects in the treatment group were told that seller’s are ranked in the 
order of their advertising expenditures whereas the control group was told that the order of seller’s on the listing is 
random.  In the follow-up survey, subjects were asked two questions about the ranking of the sellers in the listing to 
test whether the treatment manipulation was successful or not.  These two questions were “in your opinion, did the 
seller on the third rank incur a higher advertising cost than the seller on the fourth rank on the list” and “in your 
opinion, did the seller on the first rank incur the highest adverting cost than the rest of the sellers on the list”.  
Subjects answered on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  We create a 
“AdvertisingExpenditure” variable using these two items (cronbach’s alpha=.91) and conduct t- test to examine if 
the two groups differ in terms of the knowledge about relative advertising expenditure.   
We find that subject’s belief about the seller ordering differs significantly.  Mean score for treatment group was 5.93 
whereas mean score for control group was 3.54 (p<0.001).  This implies that the subjects in both the groups did read 
and understand the instructions, especially regarding the manipulation.  Thus, we find that as desired the control 
group and treatment group differ in terms of the knowledge about the seller’s relative advertising expenditure.    
Findings 
We compare the distributions of seller quality beliefs in control and treatment group to test the hypothesis (H1) that 
awareness of the sponsored search allocation mechanism will lead consumers to believe that sellers higher on the 
listing are of higher quality (i.e., positive advertisement-quality beliefs), and find support for our assertion.  Results 
from a t-test show that the advertisement-quality belief (HRHQ) for the treatment group is significantly greater than 
4 (mean=4.60, p<0.01) whereas the mean score for the control group is significantly lower than 4 (mean=2.44, 
p<0.01).  The results imply that a large proportion of consumers use information about relative advertising 
expenditure to infer the relative quality of sellers.   
For subject’s price-quality beliefs, both groups score high on the scale measuring the price-quality correlation belief 
(HPHQ) (mean of 4.97 and 4.90 for control and treatment group, respectively).  Both these means are above 4 
(p<0.01) which is the midpoint of the Likert scale suggesting a neutral belief.  Thus, results support hypothesis 2a.  
Further, we compare the mean price-quality scores across groups to test if presence of the advertising signals lowers 
the belief in price signal.  Results from a t-test suggest that the strength of price-quality belief does not differ across 
groups (p=0.90).  Thus, we reject hypothesis 2b.   
Next, we examine the shopping behavior (i.e., search intensity, price premium, and position premium) of subjects in 
the control and treatment conditions.  For search intensity, the subjects do not appear to be different across control 
and treatment groups.  Approximately 50% of the subjects in both groups visit only 1 or 2 sellers.  The distribution 
of the price premium paid shows that subjects in the treatment group pay a much smaller price premium as 
compared to the subjects in control group.  Only 25% (approximately) subjects in treatment group pay more than 34 
units in price premium whereas around 50% subjects in control group pay more than 34 units in price premium.  The 
distribution of the rank of the sellers from where subjects bought the product shows that subjects in the treatment 
group bought from sellers towards top on the listing as compared to subjects in the control group.  However the 
difference between ranks is very small.  Percentile scores show that 25% subjects in the treatment group bought 
from sellers ranked 3 or less whereas only 10% subjects in the control group bought from sellers ranked 3 or less.    
We tested the hypotheses related to consumer search and purchase behavior using a set of three regression equations 
as specified below: 
SearchIntensity i = α1 + α2* HRHQi + α3* HPHQi + α4* HRHQi*HPHQi + ei -- Equation (1) 
PricePremiumi = β1 + β2* HRHQi + β3* HPHQi + β4* HRHQi*HPHQi + ei -- Equation (2) 
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RankPremiumi = γ1 + γ2* HRHQi + γ3* HPHQi + γ4*HRHQi*HPHQi + ei -- Equation (3) 
where i stands for the subjects.   
Results of the Breusch-Pagan test show that the error terms are correlated across the equations (chi2[3] =  21.296, 
p<0.01).  We use a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation technique6 to account for this correlation.  SUR 
generates the same regression coefficients as ordinary least square (OLS) model as the independent variables across 
the equations do not change, but is more efficient for correlated errors.  Results of the SUR analysis are in Table 3.   
Table 3:  Quality Beliefs and Shopping Behavior*  
Search Intensity Price Premium Rank Premium 
c_HPHQ‡ -0.063 5.87*** 0.14 
(-0.48) (4.26) (1.35) 
c_HRHQ‡ 0.018 -3.98*** -.023*** 
(0.17) (-3.54) (-2.65) 
c_HPHQ*c_HRHQ 0..05 -0.74 -0.04 
(0.69) (-0.93) (-0.68) 
Constant 2.97*** 26.67*** 4.36*** 
(17.46) (15.06) (31.43) 
Observations 80 80 80 
R-square 0.01 0.31 0.11 
Chi-square 0.95 36.54 10.09 
z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
‡ These variables are mean centered to avoid multicollinearity. 
Surprisingly, we find that subjects relying on different types of signals (i.e. price and/or advertising) do not differ in 
terms of search intensity.  Neither the overall model nor any of the coefficients are significant in explaining search 
intensity.  Thus, we reject both the hypotheses – H3b, and H4b -- related to search intensity.    
We find some interesting results for price premium and rank premium which appear to depend on the type and 
intensity of quality beliefs held by the subjects.  Subjects having stronger price-quality beliefs pay a larger price 
premium.  A unit increase (from the mean levels) in the strength of the price-quality belief leads to a 5.87 unit 
increase in the price premium paid by the subjects.  By contrast, subjects who believe in the rank-quality signal pay 
lower price premium.  A unit increase (from the mean levels) in the strength of the rank-quality belief leads to a 3.98 
unit decrease in the price premium paid by the subjects.  Thus we find support for hypothesis H3a and H4a.  The 
interaction between price-quality and rank-quality beliefs is not significant, suggesting absence of moderation 
effects of rank-quality signal (i.e., advertising signal) on the relationship between price-quality signal and price 
premium paid by the subjects.  Thus, we reject hypothesis H5. 
The rank premium regression suggests that subjects with stronger rank-quality beliefs tend to buy from sellers 
higher on the list (i.e., closer to the top).  Thus we find support for hypothesis H3c.  Further, we do not find a direct 
effect of the price signal on rank premium, or a significant moderating effect for the price signal on the relationship 
between the advertising signal and rank premium.  This leads us to reject hypothesis H4c and H6. The summary of 
the results is presented in Table 4. 
 
6 We also conducted multivariate regression and the results are consistent with SUR analysis.  
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Table 4:  Results Summary 
H1 Awareness of ranking mechanism (i.e., top sellers pay more) leads to positive 
rank-quality correlation 
Supported 
H2a Consumers have positive price-quality beliefs  Supported 
H2b Consumers who are aware of the ranking mechanism will have weaker belief in 
positive price-quality correlation as compared to the consumers who are 
unaware of the ranking mechanism 
Not supported 
H3 The stronger the consumer’s belief in advertising signal: 
a the lower will be the price premium paid by the consumer Supported 
b the lower will be the consumer’s search intensity Not Supported 
c the larger will be the rank premium enjoyed by the seller Supported 
H4 The stronger the consumer’s belief in price signal: 
a the higher will be the price premium paid by the consumer. Supported 
b the higher will be the consumer’s search intensity Not Supported 
c the smaller will be the rank premium enjoyed by the seller Not Supported 
H5  The stronger the consumer’s belief in advertising signal (i.e., positive rank-
quality belief), the weaker will be the impact of price signal (price-quality belief) 
on price premium.  
Not Supported 
H6 The stronger the consumer’s belief in price signal (i.e., positive price-quality 
belief), the weaker will be the impact of advertising signal (rank-quality belief) 
on rank premium 
Not Supported 
Discussion 
Results from this study highlight interesting dynamics between advertising and price as signals of quality, as well as 
the importance of understanding consumers’ attitudes towards risk.  While the awareness of the sponsored search 
advertisements does not change the overall click-through rates, the click-through as well as conversion rates tend to 
increase at higher listing ranks.   
We also find that consumers who have knowledge of the sponsored nature of the search results (advertising signal) 
pay a smaller price premium, compared to the control group.  We find that consumers who have stronger belief in 
price as a signal of quality pay a higher price premium and consumers who have stronger belief in advertising as a 
signal of quality pay a higher rank premium (i.e., are more likely to buy from firms appearing on the top).  However, 
the advertising signal seems to weaken the price signal.  Advertising signal belief leads a consumer to pay a lower 
price premium.  Price signal belief, on the other hand, does not impact the rank premium.  This finding is contrary to 
the extant findings which suggest that price signals strongly dominate advertising signals (Broniarczyk and Alba, 
1994).  This interesting difference can be attributed to the directional nature of the sponsored search format and 
unique characteristic of the sponsored search advertising medium which informs consumers about the relative 
advertising intensity/expenditure of all the firms within a market.   
Our results also indicate that consumer behavior in online markets is distinct from that in traditional markets; likely 
due to due to the unique informational environments created by the online medium.  As argued in prior work, 
changes in the content and format of online information, as well as consumer knowledge about online market 
mechanisms are likely to influence perceptions and attitudes.  Our results add to this body of work.  To the extent 
that consumer beliefs and perceptions are key drivers of behavior in online settings, it is important to understand 
their antecedents.  This is especially true in emerging contexts such as sponsored search because the revenues and 
strategies of both advertisers and intermediaries are dependent on consumer search and purchase strategy as 
reflected in the click-through and conversion rate at various ranks in the sponsored search listing.  Our results 
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suggest that making consumers aware of the allocation mechanism where sellers are ranked based on their 
advertising intensity is likely to be of value to the search engines and advertising intermediaries.  Though the 
number of clicks may not increase, the advertising signal beliefs of consumers may increase the conversion rates at 
top ranks. This increased competition for top slots in the sponsored search auctions would lead to better 
monetization of the online real estate.   
This study also opens up promising avenues for future research in the sponsored search advertising field.  It would 
be interesting to study the effect of different rank allocation mechanisms on consumer advertising-quality beliefs 
and consequent behavior.  As noted earlier, search intermediaries employ different allocation mechanisms.  Yahoo 
ranks firms based on how much a firm is willing to pay per click whereas Google ranks firms based the past traffic 
generated by a firm in addition to its willingness to pay.  Search intermediaries have also tried or are testing other 
allocation mechanism such as allocating ranks based on based on willingness to “pay per action” or willingness to 
“pay per impression” (Lee, 2002; Newcomb, 2005).  These mechanisms differ in the type of information that they 
convey about the firms ranked higher on the listing and therefore may differ in the terms of the indirect cues they 
can provide about firms’ quality.  We expect that the strength of consumers’ belief sin a rank-quality correlation and 
reliance on rank (i.e., higher rank premium) while making a purchase will increase as we move from “pay per 
action” to “pay per click” to “pay per impression”.  It would further be interesting to see the signaling effect of 
Google’s allocation mechanism that also takes into account the past click-through rate (i.e., “market share adjusted 
pay per click”) obtained by a firm and thus may act as a proxy of a firm’s market share.       
Conclusion 
The sponsored search advertising format is unique in that the position of a seller’s advertisement in the search 
listings for a keyword is indicative of the advertising expenses borne by a seller, relative to other sellers/advertisers 
in the same list.  Simply put, consumers who are aware of the mechanics of sponsored search auctions can infer that 
sellers appearing closer to the top of the search listing have bid higher than those appearing lower down.  This 
provides us a unique opportunity to examine theories relating to advertising signals and consumer behavior in the 
online context, but there is limited empirical work to date.  A key contribution of this study is that it is among the 
first to investigate how consumer knowledge about advertising mechanism in a sponsored search setting influences 
purchase behavior, mediated by quality perceptions.  It is also one of handful of studies that investigate how 
consumer behavior is shaped by interactions among different informational signals.  Finally, by virtue of the fact 
that we measure behavioral outcomes related to search intensity, price sensitivity, and actual purchase behavior, this 
study extends the literature on advertising as a signal of quality that has typically used perceived quality as an 
outcome variable.   
Sponsored search advertisers and online intermediaries responsible for providing sponsored search listings can gain 
useful insights from our findings.  Our results suggest that as more consumers become aware of the sponsored 
search mechanism, consumers may buy from a seller on a higher rank even if the price is higher/lower than other 
sellers.  Thus, profit maximization for sellers must simultaneously address pricing and advertising decisions.  For 
online intermediaries, a recommendation that emerges is the need to align the sponsored search allocation 
mechanism with consumers’ beliefs and behaviors such that it remains consistent with the consumer’s 
advertisement-quality signal.  Failing to do so creates a potential risk in that over time, the auction mechanism could 
collapse because consumers do not click and buy at the top ranks.  Finally, we believe that the investigation of 
consumer behavior in online sponsored search markets will enable researchers to develop more realistic normative 
models.   
Future research can extend this study by examining the interactions between advertisers and consumers strategies 
over multiple periods and adaptation due to learning in a dynamic market setting.  Another fruitful avenue for 
research may be to examine the impact of organic search results and presence of sellers with known quality in the 
sponsored listing on consumer behavior.  Further, researchers can also examine consumer behavior in markets with 
correlated price and advertising variables.  Analytical models may also be developed to predict the optimal search in 
a market with quality uncertainty where a consumer has to rely on quality signals. 
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